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THE PROBLEMS WITH THE REPORTER’S 
PRIVILEGE 
RANDALL D. ELIASON*
INTRODUCTION 
At this writing, the United States Congress is closer than ever to 
passing a federal reporter’s privilege or shield law.1  The law would, 
with some exceptions, shield journalists from being compelled to 
testify concerning the identity of their confidential sources and other 
information gathered during the course of their work.  Privilege 
advocates frame their arguments with lofty rhetoric about the free 
press and the First Amendment, implying that support for the 
privilege ranks right up there with support for baseball and apple 
pie.2  But it is important to look beyond the rhetoric and examine 
 *  Professorial Lecturer in Law, American University, Washington College of Law 
and George Washington University Law School.  The author was an Assistant United 
States Attorney for the District of Columbia for twelve years and served as Chief of 
the Public Corruption/Government Fraud Section from 1999–2001.  This Article is a 
compilation and elaboration of points made during the Symposium by both myself 
and Professor Steven Clymer—points that each of us has made elsewhere.  See Free 
Flow of Information Act of 2007:  Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52–63 (2007) (testimony of Randall Eliason, Professorial 
Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School); Reporters’ Privilege 
Legislation:  Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16–18, 85–93 (2006) (testimony of Steven D. Clymer, 
Professor, Cornell Law School); Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate 
Inmates:  The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385 
(2006). 
 1. The House of Representatives passed the federal shield law, the Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, on October 16, 2007 by a vote of 398 to 21.  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Senate version of the law, S. 2035, on 
October 22, 2007, and sent it to the full Senate for consideration.  
 2.  Quotes from the founding fathers are always popular to demonstrate the 
fundamental rightness of one’s cause.  For example, privilege advocates Dr. James 
Tucker and Professor Stephen Wermiel quote Thomas Jefferson as saying that “our 
liberty . . . cannot be guarded but by the freedom of the press, nor that be limited 
without danger of losing it.”  James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting a 
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exactly what a shield law would and would not accomplish.  Contrary 
to popular belief, it is possible to cherish the First Amendment and 
the free press and still think the reporter’s privilege is a bad idea. 
Underlying the arguments in favor of the shield law are a number 
of claims about the current legal landscape involving subpoenas to 
journalists, the potential effect of a shield law, and the behavior of 
reporters and confidential sources.  Repeated uncritically and widely 
assumed to be true, these claims are an accepted part of the narrative 
surrounding the supposed need for a privilege.  Closer examination, 
however, reveals that these claims rest on a shaky or even non-
existent foundation.  I would like to discuss what I believe are eight 
myths surrounding the need for, and effect of, a reporter’s privilege.  
Once these myths are exposed, the privilege is revealed for what it is:  
a flawed, unnecessary piece of legislation that will not accomplish its 
goals. 
MYTH #1: THERE IS CURRENTLY AN INTOLERABLE FLOOD OF 
SUBPOENAS BEING ISSUED TO JOURNALISTS 
There is one fact that almost everyone involved in the privilege 
debate seems to accept as a given:  reporters today are being 
subpoenaed at an unprecedented clip, resulting in a crisis within the 
journalism community.  As far back as 1999, the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press was lamenting that journalists 
were “drowning in a sea of subpoenas.”3  A witness before the House 
Judiciary Committee in 2007 declared that there has been a “deluge” 
of subpoenas to reporters in recent years.4  But despite the watery 
metaphors, one searching for evidence of this crisis will come up dry.  
Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1291, 1294 [hereinafter Tucker & Wermiel]. But the issue is not whether freedom of 
the press is a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy. We can all agree that it is.  
The issue is whether a reporter’s shield law is really important to the free press, and 
whether the arguments in favor of the law stand up to critical scrutiny.     
   And just to show that the founding fathers are not taking sides, I note that 
Jefferson also said, “Advertisements . . . contain the only truths to be relied on in a 
newspaper,” and “The man who reads nothing at all is better educated than the man 
who reads nothing but newspapers.”  See The Quotations Page: Journalism, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/subects/journalism (last visited May 16, 2008).  It’s 
probably hard to say how Mr. Jefferson would have come down on the question of a 
special legal privilege for reporters.  
 3. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY:  A 
REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 1997, at 1 
(1999). 
 4. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007:  Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 32 (2007) [hereinafter H.R. 2102 Hearing] 
(testimony of Lee Levine, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP). 
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Indeed, it is remarkable how little factual support there is for this 
claim, given how widely it is assumed to be true.5
It is true that there has been a handful of high-profile cases in the 
past few years involving subpoenas to reporters.  These include the 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) leak/Valerie Plame investigation 
where former New York Times reporter Judith Miller went to jail for 
refusing to identify a source;6 the case involving grand jury subpoenas 
to two reporters from the San Francisco Chronicle for information 
concerning their source for stories on the Bay Area Laboratory Co-
 5. Thirty-six years ago in the landmark case of Branzburg v. Hayes reporters made 
the same argument, claiming that the number of subpoenas to the press was 
increasing and that the privilege was needed more than ever.  408 U.S. 665, 699 
(1972).  In Branzburg, a closely divided Supreme Court held that reporters do not 
have a privilege under the First Amendment to refuse to testify in grand jury 
proceedings concerning their confidential sources.  Id. at 667.   
     Branzburg was a 5-4 decision, with the majority opinion written by Justice White.    
Justice Powell, who joined Justice White’s opinion, also wrote what his dissenting 
colleagues called an “enigmatic” concurrence, id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 
suggesting that there might be some protection for reporters if a grand jury 
investigation was being conducted in bad faith.  Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
     Over the years, privilege advocates have often mischaracterized the Branzburg 
holding as a plurality opinion, and have urged courts to recognize a privilege based 
on Justice Powell’s concurrence.  See Frontline:  News War:  Interview with James Goodale 
(PBS television broadcast Oct. 21, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/goodale.html (describing litigation strategy of 
using Justice Powell’s concurrence to argue that Branzburg actually upheld the 
privilege).  Unfortunately, Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel have repeated this 
mischaracterization.  See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1299 (arguing that 
Justice White was “[w]riting for a plurality in Branzburg,”); see also id. at  1293, 1298; 
Stephen Wermiel, Professor, Washington College of Law, Remarks at the American 
University Law Review Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, 
Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast” 
hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the press:  The growing use of 
subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008) 
(characterizing Branzburg as a plurality opinion).  Whatever Justice Powell intended 
by his brief concurrence, it is beyond dispute that he fully joined Justice White’s 
opinion, and that it was the opinion of a five-Justice majority, not a plurality.  See, e.g., 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller) 438 F.3d 1141, 1148 (D.C. Cir.  2005)  (“Justice 
White’s opinion is not a plurality opinion of four justices joined by a separate Justice 
Powell to create a majority, it is the opinion of the majority of the Court.”); In re 
Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that in Branzburg Justice 
Powell “wrote separately but joined in the majority opinion as the necessary fifth 
vote”).  The majority opinion squarely rejects the claim that there is a First 
Amendment-based reporter’s privilege, at least in the grand jury context.  Branzburg, 
408 U.S. at 667.   
 6. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d at 1142.  The CIA leak case 
involved an investigation into which government officials may have improperly 
disclosed to the press the fact that Valerie Plame worked for the CIA.  Plame is the 
wife of former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who had criticized the Bush 
administration over the Iraq war.  For a detailed discussion of the CIA leak case, see 
Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates:  The Misguided Pursuit of 
a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 387–91 (2006). 
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operative (“BALCO”) steroids investigation;7 the case in Rhode Island 
where television reporter Jim Taricani was sentenced to six months of 
home confinement for contempt after refusing to identify a source;8 
and the Privacy Act9 lawsuits filed by Dr. Wen Ho Lee10 and by Dr. 
Steven Hatfill.11  Recent calls for a shield law have been largely 
spurred by these cases, particularly by the jailing of Judith Miller.  
Virtually every article or argument in support of the privilege cites 
these same few cases as evidence of the supposed crisis.12
 7. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (BALCO), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006).  The BALCO case involved four individuals charged with the illegal 
distribution of anabolic steroids and other performance enhancing drugs to a 
number of professional athletes.  Id.  Two reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle 
wrote stories that contained the confidential grand jury testimony of several 
prominent athletes.  Because the grand jury information had been subject to a 
protective order, the judge asked the government to investigate who had leaked the 
information to the press.  The reporters refused to testify in the grand jury 
concerning their sources, and the judge denied their claim of reporter’s privilege.  
See id.  They were held in contempt, but while their appeal was pending before the 
Ninth Circuit their source was identified by other means and the government 
dropped the subpoenas of the reporters.  See Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits Leaking 
BALCO Testimony, SAN FRAN. CHRONICLE, Feb. 15, 2007, at A1. 
 8. See In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2004).  
Acting in violation of a federal judge’s protective order, a source gave Taricani a copy 
of an undercover surveillance tape that was evidence in an upcoming corruption 
trial.  Taricani aired the tape, and the judge ordered an investigation into the leak.  
Id. at 40–41.   When Taricani refused to identify his source, he was found guilty of 
contempt and sentenced to six months home confinement.  H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra 
note 4, at 63 (testimony of James Taricani); see Peter Johnson, Reporter Confined to 
Home for Refusal to Identify Source, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2004, at 6A. 
 9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2002). 
 10. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  Dr. Wen Ho 
Lee is a scientist who was employed by the Department of Energy.  From 1996 to 
1999 he was investigated on suspicion of spying for China.  He was indicted on fifty-
nine counts of mishandling classified information but was later allowed to plead 
guilty to a single count.  He filed a civil suit alleging that government agents had 
violated the Privacy Act by improperly disclosing to the press personal information 
about him and his status as a suspect.  Id. at 55–56.  After losing on their claims of 
reporter’s privilege, id. at 64, the media companies whose reporters were 
subpoenaed joined with the government to settle Dr. Lee’s case for more than $1.6 
million.  Paul Farhi, U.S. ,Media Settle with Wen Ho Lee, News Organizations Pay to Keep 
Sources Secret, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A01.  Five media organizations paid 
$750,000 of this amount, even though they were not defendants in the case. Id.  
 11. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2007).  Dr. Steven 
Hatfill was named in the press as a suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks in Washington 
D.C., although he was never charged.  See Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 
108–09 (D.D.C. 2005).  He has filed a Privacy Act suit alleging that FBI and other 
government officials improperly leaked information about him to the press.   Id.  Dr. 
Hatfill has subpoenaed a number of reporters and news organizations to identify 
their sources, and as this Article goes to press the litigation over their claims of 
reporter’s privilege is ongoing.  See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
 12. Two other recent significant cases generated less publicity and did not 
involve compelling reporters to reveal the identities of confidential sources.  In San 
Francisco, freelance videographer Josh Wolf was held in contempt and jailed for 
refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena for video footage that he shot of a 
group of G-8 protestors.  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Wolf), No. 06-16403, 2006 
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These cases did generate a good deal of publicity, in part because it 
is so rare for reporters to be subpoenaed.  But despite the level of 
publicity, they remain only a few cases.  A handful of cases over 
several years is more a trickle than a deluge, given the countless 
thousands of newspaper, television, radio, and Internet news reports 
filed every day.  Walter Pincus, a veteran investigative reporter for the 
Washington Post who was subpoenaed in both the Valerie Plame and 
Wen Ho Lee cases, was closer to the mark when he wrote that these 
recent high-profile cases represent merely a “blip” in the number of 
subpoenas issued to reporters.13  
Privilege advocates who repeatedly invoke these same few cases as 
proof of the flood of subpoenas are committing a common logical 
fallacy known as “hasty generalization.”  The error lies in generalizing 
to an entire population based upon a sample that is too small to be 
meaningful.  Examples would include arguing, “Joe, the Australian, 
stole my wallet.  I guess all Australians are thieves,” or “The plane that 
crashed was being flown by a woman.  I guess women don’t make very 
good pilots.”14
By way of analogy, consider that there are more than a dozen shark 
attacks on swimmers in the United States each year.15  Each attack 
may generate some publicity, and no doubt each is an important 
event to those involved.  Nevertheless, we don’t conclude there is a 
crisis because everyone recognizes that, relative to the total number 
of swimmers each year, the number of shark attacks is very small.  By 
the same token, a couple dozen federal subpoenas to journalists over 
WL 2631398 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006).  In the other case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit denied a claim of privilege and held that prosecutors could 
subpoena the telephone records of two New York Times reporters, including Judith 
Miller, to investigate who in the government may have improperly leaked 
confidential law enforcement information to the press.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2006). 
As this Article goes to press, a new subpoena controversy has arisen.  James Risen, a 
reporter for the New York Times, received a subpoena from a grand jury in 
Alexandria, Virginia, apparently seeking information about his confidential sources 
for a book he wrote in 2006 about the CIA, State of War.  This case will have the added 
wrinkle that although Risen works for the Times, the subpoena relates to his book, 
not to any reporting he did for the newspaper.  Risen’s attorney has said he intends 
to fight the subpoena.  See Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for 
Book Chapter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A17. 
 13. Walter Pincus, Commentary, Walter Pincus Sees Shield Law as ‘a Bad Misstep’, 
NIEMAN WATCHDOG, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=218. 
 14. See NICHOLAS CAPALDI, THE ART OF DECEPTION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL 
THINKING 118–19 (1987) (describing the hasty generalization fallacy). 
 15. See Brian Handwerk, Shark Facts:  Attack Stats, Record Swims, More, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, June 13, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ 
2005/06/0613_050613_sharkfacts.html. 
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the past few years do not, without more, signify a crisis, given the 
enormous number of stories being reported every day. 
Privilege proponent and former Solicitor General Ted Olson 
provided a recent example of this fallacy in an op-ed piece in the 
Washington Post.16  Olson claimed that it has become “almost routine” 
for journalists to be subpoenaed:  “From the Valerie Plame imbroglio 
to the Wen Ho Lee case, it is now de rigueur to round up reporters, 
haul them before a court and threaten them with fines and jail 
sentences unless they reveal their sources.”17  Citing only two recent 
well-known cases, therefore, Olson concludes that the extraordinary 
circumstances of those cases are now “routine” around the country.  
This makes for fine rhetorical flourishes, but it is a flawed argument.  
These cases attracted so much attention precisely because they were 
so unusual.  It is simply false to claim that the exceptional is now the 
norm. 
There is surprisingly little data on exactly how frequently reporters 
are subpoenaed.18  Indeed, at the same time press representatives 
were testifying before Congress that journalists were facing an 
unprecedented flood of subpoenas that had reached “epidemic” 
proportions,19 the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press was 
admitting on its website that “we simply cannot know for certain” how 
many subpoenas journalists receive, or whether that number is on the 
rise.20  Given this admitted uncertainty, it’s remarkable that journalists 
would claim they are facing a crisis requiring congressional 
intervention.  One can only imagine how the press would react if, for 
example, the Bush Administration claimed publicly that we were 
 16. Theodore B. Olson, Op-Ed, . . . Or Safeguards?, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at 
A25. 
 17. Id. 
 18. It’s also important to recognize that the existence of a shield law will not 
mean that federal subpoenas to the media will stop.  The media still receive state 
level subpoenas, despite some degree of statutory or judicial reporter’s privilege 
protection in almost every state.  See Kevin Rector, A Flurry of Subpoenas, AM. 
JOURNALISM REV., Apr./May 2008, http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4511 (noting 
that an upcoming University of Arizona study documents that state subpoenas to the 
media are nearly ten times more common than federal subpoenas, even though 
reporters have some legal protection in forty-nine states and Washington D.C.).  A 
federal shield law as shot through with exceptions and qualifications as the one 
proposed will invite litigants to continue to serve subpoenas and argue that the 
privilege does not apply in their case.  At best, the law will mean that journalists will 
be somewhat more likely to prevail at the end of such litigation than they are today.  
The media will not be relieved of the burden of fighting such subpoenas altogether. 
 19. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 32 (testimony of Lee Levine, Levine 
Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP). 
 20. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS:  
THE REPORTERS’ PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL COURTS, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and 
_subpoenas.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS]. 
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facing a “deluge” of new terrorists in our midst, while admitting in 
other documents that it really had no idea whether or not this was 
true. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) attorneys are required by regulation 
to seek the Attorney General’s approval for subpoenas to the media, 
and to demonstrate that the information is essential and all 
reasonable alternatives have been exhausted.21  Data from the DOJ 
indicates that, on average, there have been about a dozen DOJ-
approved subpoenas to journalists each year over the past six years, 
and that number has been declining.22  DOJ subpoenas that actually 
seek confidential source information are even more rare, averaging 
only about one a year since 1991.23  As far as the DOJ is concerned, 
therefore, evidence of a deluge is lacking.24
Other information concerning the number of subpoenas to 
reporters is largely anecdotal and potentially misleading.25  For 
 21. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007). 
 22. See SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS, supra note 20. 
 23. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (testimony of Rachel L. Brand, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice) 
(testifying that only nineteen DOJ subpoenas to the press for confidential source 
information have been approved since 1991). 
 24. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that these numbers might be 
misleading because the DOJ regulations supposedly do not apply to special 
prosecutors, and “[m]any of the most widely reported cases of press subpoenas 
involved special prosecutors.”  Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1306, see id. at 
1320.   They don’t list the “many” cases to which they are referring.  I am aware of 
two:  the CIA leak case, and the case involving the subpoena to Rhode Island 
reporter Jim Taricani.  In both of those cases, the courts found that even under the 
DOJ regulations the subpoenas would have been proper.  See In re Special 
Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he short answer is that a 
government prosecutor could have subpoenaed Taricani consistent with the 
[Attorney General’s] regulations.”); In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 
2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Assuming, arguendo, that the DOJ guidelines did vest a 
right in the movants in these cases, this Court holds that the DOJ guidelines are fully 
satisfied by the facts of this case . . . .”).   Special prosecutors are rare, and those who 
need to subpoena a reporter are even more so.  It is wrong to suggest that there are 
large numbers of special prosecutors roaming the country and subpoenaing 
reporters in disregard of the DOJ guidelines. 
 25. One number that is often heard is that there have been more than forty 
federal court subpoenas to reporters in the past few years.  See Editorial, Shielding 
Sources, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at A16; Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1319–
20; see also Lucy Dalglish, Executive Dir., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
Remarks at the American University Law Review Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold?  
The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 
2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# 
(follow “webcast” hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the press:  The 
growing use of subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 
2008).  Even if accurate, this number is potentially misleading because more than 
twenty of those subpoenas stem from only two cases:  the Privacy Act suits filed by 
Wen Ho Lee and Steven Hatfill.  Other cases, such as the Valerie Plame investigation, 
similarly involved subpoenas to a number of different reporters.  Thus the total 
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example, Eve Burton, general counsel to the Hearst Corporation, has 
claimed that Hearst news organizations received about one hundred 
subpoenas during a thirty-two-month period from 2005–2007.26  It 
would be a simple matter for Hearst to compile a list of those 
subpoenas in order to bolster its arguments in favor of the privilege, 
but no such list has been forthcoming.  If we had such a list, we could 
answer a few key questions.  For example, how many of those 
subpoenas were from state or local tribunals?  The vast majority of 
litigation occurs at the state level, and it is fair to assume that most of 
the one hundred subpoenas were also from the state level.27  A federal 
privilege statute would not affect state subpoenas, and so the 
presence of such subpoenas does not support the need for a federal 
law.28  Claiming there have been a hundred subpoenas likewise tells 
us nothing about the circumstances underlying each subpoena.  For 
example, how many were really serious attempts that resulted in a 
court battle, and how many were half-hearted or impulsive efforts by 
an attorney who backed down as soon as the journalist’s lawyers 
objected?29  How many of these subpoenas sought the identity of a 
source or other truly confidential information, and how many merely 
sought peripheral information or material that had already been 
published and was not confidential?30  Finally, given that Hearst is one 
number of cases where subpoenas to the press are an issue is far smaller than the total 
number of subpoenas. 
 26. See Lori Robertson, Kind of Confidential, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June/July 2007, 
1, 28 (quoting Eve Burton); see also Eve Burton, Gen. Counsel, Hearst Corp., 
Remarks at American Society of Newspaper Editors First Amendment Summit (Jan. 
18, 2007), available at http://www.asne.org/files/mpeg/fas/propanel11.mov (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2008) (noting that Hearst media companies received about eighty 
subpoenas over a two-year period). 
 27. See Rector, supra note 18 (discussing University of Arizona study’s finding that 
state subpoenas to the media are vastly more common than federal subpoenas).   
 28. Some might argue that a federal shield law would still be important in state 
cases because it would demonstrate a national policy and commitment that might 
have persuasive force in such cases.  This assumes that a litigant, who was not 
deterred from subpoenaing a reporter by state shield laws or court decisions that 
would actually apply, would somehow be deterred by the moral force of a federal 
statute that would not apply.  This seems very unlikely. 
 29. For example, in a recent case in Seattle, a lawyer in the City Attorney’s office 
issued three subpoenas to reporters for the Seattle Times asking them to identify 
confidential sources in stories about police misconduct.  When the paper objected, 
the City Attorney withdrew the subpoenas a week later, saying he had not approved 
their issuance.  These three subpoenas would no doubt appear on a list compiled of 
subpoenas issued to the media, even though they were quickly withdrawn, led to no 
litigation, and did not result in the press being required to reveal any information.  
See Gene Johnson, Seattle Drops Subpoenas for Newspaper, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 
2007. 
 30. For example, litigants or prosecutors may occasionally subpoena a television 
station for a copy of a report that was aired on the station, in order to help them in 
an investigation or trial.  This is material that was publicly aired and is not 
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of the largest media companies in the world, one can legitimately 
question whether an average of less than one subpoena a week 
nationwide is really as staggering a number as Burton appears to 
believe.31
Even if one could establish that the overall number of subpoenas to 
the media has increased in recent years, this would have to be 
considered in light of the changed media environment.  At the time 
Branzburg v. Hayes32 was decided in 1972, the media consisted largely 
of three television networks, local newspapers, and radio.  There has 
been an explosion of new media outlets since that time.  We now live 
in an era of 24/7 non-stop news coverage streaming from the 
Internet, cable television, and satellite transmissions, in addition to 
the more traditional print and broadcast formats.  The media is more 
pervasive and more intertwined with our lives than ever before.  
Given the huge growth in the number of media outlets and formats, 
as well as in the number of proclaimed journalists,33 it would be 
remarkable if the overall number of subpoenas to the media was not 
rising.  However, such an increase in the number of subpoenas would 
not necessarily indicate a change in the legal landscape.  If there are 
ten times as many journalists as there were thirty years ago, then even 
if there are ten times as many subpoenas, things are simply staying 
about the same.34
confidential, but will likely still require a subpoena, which presumably would show 
up on a tally of the total number of subpoenas received. 
 31. According to the Hearst website, the company publishes twelve newspapers 
and nineteen U.S. magazine titles, owns twenty-six television stations, and is also 
involved in numerous other media and entertainment activities in the United States 
and overseas.  Hearst Corporate Site, http://www.hearstcorp.com (last visited Apr. 
10, 2008).  If forty subpoenas a year were evenly spread among the Hearst 
companies, that would be less than one subpoena a year per domestic newspaper, 
magazine, or station.  Again, not much of a deluge. 
 32. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 33. This is particularly true in light of the explosive growth of the Internet, and 
of the huge number of bloggers and ordinary citizens who may now have a right to 
call themselves journalists in a medium that barely existed only a decade ago.  See 
infra notes 92–109 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of the Internet and 
definition of a journalist). 
 34.  There was reference at the Symposium to an upcoming study by a University 
of Arizona law professor that will purport to document the number of subpoenas 
received by the media in 2006.  Remarks at the American University Law Review 
Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the 
Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.ed 
u/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast” hyperlink next to “Censoring and 
prosecuting the press:  The growing use of subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield 
legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008); see Rector, supra note 18 (discussing the 
forthcoming study).  It remains to be seen how useful the data from this study will 
be.  A potential problem is that the study apparently relied upon media 
organizations voluntarily to return a questionnaire about any subpoenas received, 
and the response rate was about thirty-eight percent.  The study then apparently 
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As columnist Jack Shafer recently noted in Slate, “The First 
Amendment lobby would have you believe that journalists are being 
buried alive in [subpoenas], but that’s not the case.”35  The widely 
held belief about the epic flood of subpoenas to the press appears to 
be a myth.  
MYTH #2: REPORTERS ARE ROUTINELY SUBPOENAED AS A FIRST CHOICE 
OR EASY SHORTCUT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION 
Another popular claim by those who support the federal shield law 
is that it is now common for lazy prosecutors or litigants to subpoena 
journalists as a quick and easy way to obtain information and shortcut 
the need to investigate a case themselves.  For example, Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) recently argued 
that the federal privilege is needed because “the press has become 
the first stop, rather than the last resort, for our government and 
private litigants when it comes to seeking information.”36  The facts 
suggest otherwise. 
In general, it is nonsense to suggest that subpoenaing a reporter 
can be a shortcut to obtaining anything.  Far from being quick and 
easy, subpoenaing a reporter is almost certain to slow down a case 
dramatically, with no guarantee that the relevant information will 
even be discovered in the end.37  The party issuing the subpoena can 
extrapolates from the number of subpoenas received by the respondents to assume 
that the nearly two-thirds of media organizations that did not respond also received 
subpoenas at the same rate.  Rector, supra.   This is a flawed methodology, for it is at 
least as likely that those who actually received a subpoena were more motivated to 
return the questionnaire, and many of those who failed to return it did so because 
they had received no subpoenas and did not feel it was important to respond.  It’s 
also unclear what information the study will contain concerning such issues as 
whether the subpoenas called for confidential source information or merely for non-
confidential information or material that had already been published or broadcast.  
Finally, because the study apparently considers only one year, it is unclear whether it 
will be able to document whether or not the number of subpoenas received by the 
media has been on the rise.  
 35.  Jack Shafer, We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Shield Law, Part 1, SLATE, Apr. 16, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2189186/ [hereinafter Shafer, Part 1]. 
 36. Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Urges Passage of Reporters’ Shield Law (Nov. 8, 2007), 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200711/110807c.html; see Editorial, Shield Law is 
Crucial for Information Flow, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 24, 2008, at 6B (“In too 
many instances, the subpoenas [to the press] are spawned by lawyers attempting to 
take shortcuts in the discovery process to routine cases.”). 
 37.  Privilege proponents Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel agree with this 
point.  See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1336 (“Even today, a prosecutor or civil 
litigant cannot run to the courthouse and expect to get a subpoena directing a 
journalist to reveal their source without substantial cost and delay.”). To cite just one 
example, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald’s investigation of the CIA leak case 
was held up for more than a year while he battled with the New York Times and Time 
over whether their reporters should have to testify concerning their conversations 
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expect a lengthy and expensive legal battle as the journalist fights the 
subpoena on various grounds.38  This battle may be financed by a 
large media corporation, which can and will hire some of the best 
First Amendment lawyers from the best law firms in the country.  And 
at the end of that long, expensive battle, even if the party seeking the 
information prevails, there is a good chance the reporter will refuse 
to testify anyway and will choose instead to be held in contempt of 
court.  Given any remotely hopeful alternative, a prosecutor or 
litigant with any sense at all will pursue that alternative rather than 
subpoenaing a reporter. 
Department of Justice attorneys are required by internal 
regulations to seek to subpoena a journalist only when they can 
demonstrate to senior DOJ officials that the information is essential 
to their case and that they have exhausted all other reasonable 
alternatives.39  For a DOJ attorney, attempting to subpoena a 
with White House officials.  It was widely reported that Fitzgerald’s investigation was 
complete but for resolving the question of the reporters’ testimony.  Once the 
privilege dispute was resolved and Judith Miller finally testified, the grand jury 
returned the indictment of Scooter Libby in about a month. 
 38. Although there is no federal shield law, journalists in federal cases routinely 
oppose subpoenas by arguing that they have a common-law reporter’s privilege or, 
despite Branzburg, that there is a privilege based on the First Amendment.  These 
arguments have met with varying degrees of success depending on the type of case 
involved and which court is hearing the case. See C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE & 
ROBERT C. LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 16-2, 16-3 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing 
the status of the First Amendment and common-law privilege in federal court); 
Eliason, supra note 6, at 392–99 (same). 
 39. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007).  In response to a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request, the DOJ informed the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press that in recent years the Civil Division and Civil Rights Divisions have made no 
requests to subpoena journalists, and that the only requests came from the Criminal 
Division.  See SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS, supra note 20.  This suggests that the DOJ is not 
making such requests lightly, and is generally limiting them to the most serious types 
of cases. 
The ACLU has claimed that the DOJ regularly “ignores its regulations in a 
calculated effort to gag the press.”  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PUBLISH AND PERISH:  
THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL REPORTERS’ SHIELD LAW 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/freespeech/publishperish_20070314.pdf [hereinafter 
PUBLISH AND PERISH].  The ACLU cites no evidence to back up this charge, and I am 
not aware of any that exists.  The only case discussed by the ACLU where they 
apparently believe the DOJ guidelines were not followed is the BALCO case.  See id. 
at 13–14.  Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel also criticize the subpoenas in the 
BALCO case as failing to follow the DOJ regulations.  See Tucker & Wermiel, supra 
note 2, at 1305–06.  They cite Mark Carallo, former press secretary to Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, as calling the BALCO subpoenas “the most reckless abuse of 
power I have seen in years.”  Id. at 1306.  This is a truly remarkable statement, 
coming from a member of the Administration that gave us Abu Ghraib, secret CIA 
prisons, “torture memos,” unlawful domestic surveillance, and other events that most 
would consider to be just slightly more egregious abuses of power than issuing a 
subpoena to a reporter. 
In any event, the federal judge in the BALCO case—who, unlike the ACLU, Mr. 
Carallo, and other critics, had access to the full record, including confidential grand 
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journalist and complying with those regulations means additional 
time, paperwork, levels of review and approval, and jumping through 
various hoops to seek authorization from Washington.  As a former 
federal prosecutor, I can assure you that busy DOJ attorneys do not 
eagerly seek out opportunities to complete additional paperwork and 
seek approvals from Main Justice.  If there are other avenues to the 
information, they will be pursued, not only because the regulations 
require it, but because any alternative means will almost always be 
faster, easier, and more productive than trying to get the information 
from a reporter.40
There is another reason prosecutors will hesitate to subpoena a 
reporter.  As former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh once 
noted, “Most prosecutors are very wary for a practical reason:  You 
don’t want to get the media mad at you.”41  Prosecutors have a strong 
interest in maintaining good will and a reputation for fairness in the 
community in which they work and from which their jury pools are 
drawn.  The media are hardly powerless to defend themselves if they 
feel a prosecutor has stepped out of line.  One need only recall the 
savaging that distinguished career prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald 
received at the hands of the media when he subpoenaed reporters in 
the CIA leak case.42  This calls to mind the wisdom of the old adage 
attributed to Mark Twain:  “Never pick a fight with a man who buys 
his ink by the barrel.” Prosecutors have little to gain, and much to 
lose, by antagonizing the press with unnecessary subpoenas. 
Private litigants who are not bound by the DOJ regulations are 
similarly unlikely to subpoena a reporter except as a last resort.  For a 
civil litigant, just as for a DOJ attorney, trying to obtain information 
from a reporter will not be quick and easy.  Just ask Dr. Steven Hatfill, 
who has been fighting for years to discover which government 
jury materials—ruled that that the prosecutors had complied with the DOJ 
guidelines.  In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (BALCO), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1121 n.9 
(N.D. Cal. 2006).  Likewise, although the subpoenas to the reporters in the Valerie 
Plame case are often criticized, the judge in that case also ruled that the Special 
Counsel had satisfied the DOJ guidelines.  See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 
F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004). 
The ACLU may not agree with the way the DOJ and federal judges interpret the 
DOJ guidelines, but there is no evidence the regulations are being violated or 
ignored. 
 40. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (testimony of Rachel L. Brand, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice) 
(noting the rigorous requirements of the DOJ approval process and that it is 
designed to deter prosecutors from seeking to subpoena journalists unless it is 
absolutely necessary). 
 41. Shafer, Part 1, supra note 35.  
 42. See Eliason, supra note 6, at 412–13 & n.155 (discussing media criticism of 
Fitzgerald). 
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employees wrongfully leaked private information about him that 
caused him to be accused in the press of the anthrax attacks in 
Washington, D.C., in 2001.43  In addition, in those jurisdictions that 
do recognize a qualified reporter’s privilege in civil or some criminal 
cases, the courts generally require a litigant to demonstrate that all 
other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted before the court 
will consider whether to override the privilege.44  Thus, private 
litigants, for both practical and legal reasons, generally will subpoena 
a reporter only when there is no reasonable alternative. 
As evidence that the “shortcut” claim is a myth, we need only look 
at the recent high-profile cases that have largely fueled the drive for a 
federal shield law.  In every one of those cases, without exception, 
journalists were subpoenaed not as an easy first choice, but only 
when, according to a federal judge, the party seeking the information 
had exhausted all other reasonable options.  This was true in the CIA 
leak/Valerie Plame case,45 the BALCO case,46 the Jim Taricani case,47 
the Wen Ho Lee case,48 the Hatfill case,49 and others.50
There is simply no evidence that prosecutors or litigants are now 
seeing journalists as “the first stop, rather than the last resort,” as 
Senator Leahy claimed.  Most litigants are barred by regulation, 
statute, or court rulings from pursuing such a course.  Even those 
who are not barred will, if they have any sense, look for alternative 
means of obtaining information before picking a fight with a 
reporter.  Arguing that one should subpoena a reporter as a shortcut 
to obtain information is akin to arguing that when driving from 
Washington, D.C., to New York City one should take a shortcut 
 43. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 33 (D.D.C. 2007).  Some four years 
after filing his lawsuit, Dr. Hatfill recently learned the identities of some of the 
government officials allegedly responsible for leaking information about him to the 
press.  This apparently was possible only because the officials released the reporters 
they spoke to from their earlier pledges of confidentiality after the court ruled that 
there was no privilege protecting the sources’ identities.  See David Willman, Lawyers 
Name 3 Officials as Leakers of Hatfill’s Name, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2008, at A7.  Hatfill’s 
privilege battles with other reporters continue as of this writing; former USA Today 
reporter Toni Locy was found in contempt by the judge for refusing to testify about 
her sources and is appealing that order.  Hatfill v. Mukasey, 539 F. Supp. 2d 96 
(D.D.C. 2008); see Eric Lichtblau, Reporter Held in Contempt in Anthrax Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 2008, at A15 (describing the imposition of increasing fines if Locy continued 
to violate the court order). 
 44. See DIENES, ET AL., supra note 38, § 16-2(e)(3) (discussing the standards 
applied by courts that recognize the privilege). 
 45. See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 46. See BALCO, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 47. See In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 48. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 49. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 50. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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through Los Angeles.  Once again, the facts don’t match up with the 
rhetoric of privilege advocates. 
MYTH #3: THE PRIVILEGE IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE CONFIDENTIAL 
SOURCES TO SPEAK TO REPORTERS 
The key factual claim in support of the reporter’s privilege is that 
the privilege is necessary to encourage confidential sources to come 
forward and speak to reporters.  This will, in turn, increase the flow 
of information to the public and ensure a robust free press.  In the 
absence of a privilege, the argument runs, there will be a “chilling 
effect” on confidential sources, and the flow of information to 
reporters and to the public will dry up.51  Privilege advocates speak in 
apocalyptic terms about this alleged chilling effect, claiming that 
without a privilege reporters will be reduced to “spoon feeding the 
public the ‘official’ statements of public relations officers.”52  This 
claim is the very raison d’être for the privilege; indeed, the proposed 
federal legislation—the Free Flow of Information Act—embodies this 
concept in its title. 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court was skeptical of this factual 
premise.  The Court observed that the lessons of history suggested 
the free press had always flourished without a privilege.53  Claims 
about “chilling effects” and harm to the press, the Court noted, were 
largely speculative and consisted primarily of the opinions of 
reporters themselves, and so “must be viewed in the light of the 
professional self-interest” of those making the claims.54  Overall, the 
Court concluded it was “unclear how often and to what extent 
informers are actually deterred from furnishing information” when 
reporters are compelled to testify.55  This skepticism seems as fully 
justified today as it was thirty-six years ago.56
 51. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728–36 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment); Reporters’ Shield Legislation:  Issues and 
Implications, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) 
[hereinafter Shield Hearing] (statement of the Honorable Richard Lugar, U.S. 
Senate); id. (testimony of the Honorable Mike Pence, U.S. House of 
Representatives). 
 52. Shield Hearing, supra note 51 (testimony of Lee Levine, Levine Sullivan Koch 
& Schulz, LLP). 
 53. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668–69 (majority opinion). 
 54. Id. at 694. 
 55. Id. at 693. 
 56. Not all reporters agree that the alleged “chilling effect” is real.  Walter 
Pincus, an investigative reporter for the Washington Post who was subpoenaed in the 
Valerie Plame and Wen Ho Lee cases, told reporter Jeffrey Toobin that he was 
skeptical of the chilling effect argument and that “[m]y sources are not drying up . . . 
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The strongest argument against the supposed chilling effect is 
simply the argument of history.  There has never been a federal 
shield law, and investigative journalism in this country has flourished, 
with no shortage of confidential sources.  Watergate, Iran-Contra, 
Abu Ghraib, secret CIA prisons, domestic National Security Agency 
(“NSA”) surveillance—all of these stories and countless others were 
reported through the use of confidential sources, and all without a 
federal shield law.57  Even the images of Judith Miller being jailed and 
forced to testify had no discernable effect on investigative reporting 
or on the number of stories relying upon confidential sources.58
One can grant that confidential sources are important to 
journalism without agreeing that a shield law is necessary or 
appropriate.  In other words, it is a myth to suggest that reporters 
can’t promise confidentiality without a shield law.  It is important to 
distinguish between a reporter’s promise of confidentiality to a 
source and the existence of a legal privilege.  As history makes clear, 
reporters may promise sufficient confidentiality to encourage sources 
to speak even in the absence of a privilege, simply by promising not 
to name the source in a story and never to identify the source 
voluntarily.  In fact, if this were not the case and if the alleged chilling 
effect were real, investigative journalism would have foundered long 
ago for want of a federal privilege.59
It’s reasonable to assume that most sources who wish to remain 
anonymous are concerned primarily with not having their names in 
the paper in a story the reporter writes the next day.  They are not 
[i]t hasn’t hurt me.”  Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source, NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 
35. 
 57. Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, media lawyer Lee Levine 
recited a long list of reporting that would not have been possible without 
confidential sources:  stories on the Pentagon Papers, the neutron bomb, Walter 
Reed Medical Center, Enron, Abu Ghraib, and many others.  The irony is that all of 
these stories were reported in the absence of a federal shield law—and thus they 
would not seem to provide much support for the argument that the shield law is 
necessary.  See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 33, 41–46 (testimony of Lee Levine, 
Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP). 
 58. Press reports about Abu Ghraib, secret overseas CIA prisons, and potentially 
unlawful domestic surveillance by the National Security Agency all relied on 
confidential sources, and all appeared while the Valerie Plame/Judith Miller saga 
was ongoing. 
 59. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that only sources “dumb enough or 
reckless enough to talk to a reporter without regard for his or her safety or well-
being” would speak to a reporter in the absence of a shield law.  Tucker & Wermiel, 
supra note 2, at 1325.   Every confidential source to speak to a reporter in the last 
thirty-six years—including Woodard and Bernstein’s Watergate source “Deep 
Throat,” Mark Felt—has done so despite the lack of a federal privilege.  Either every 
single confidential source since 1972 has been dumb or reckless, or Dr. Tucker and 
Professor Wermiel are wrong about the need for a shield law to encourage sources to 
come forward. 
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very likely to be looking down the road and trying to evaluate 
whether, two years from now, a judge might weigh the various terms 
and exceptions of a shield law and compel the reporter to identify 
them.  To the extent they do consider that possibility, a reporter can 
truthfully tell a source that, historically speaking, the chance that the 
reporter will ever be compelled to testify is extremely remote.  Any 
reasonable concern for confidentiality may therefore be satisfied 
simply by a reporter’s promise never to identify the source 
voluntarily.60
A perfectly reasonable and effective approach, in the absence of a 
shield law, is for a reporter to promise a source that he will protect 
the source’s identity to the extent legally possible, but will have to 
comply if a court orders him to identify the source and all appeals of 
that order are unsuccessful.61  Rhode Island reporter Jim Taricani, 
who was convicted of contempt of court for refusing to identify a 
source,62 recently described the types of promises he and his 
employer now make to confidential sources.  They essentially agree 
that they will fight to protect a source as far as the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, but if they lose at that level they want the 
source to agree that he or she may then be identified.63  Although 
Taricani believes this is a terrible state of affairs, actually it is a very 
reasonable agreement and should be all that any source can rightfully 
expect.64  After all, the source is really doing no more than agreeing 
that the reporter should obey the law by using all legal means to 
protect the source, but complying with lawful court orders in the end 
 60. See Reporters’ Privilege Legislation:  Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 86 (2006) (statement of 
Steven D. Clymer, Professor, Cornell Law School) (“Information flows to journalists 
despite the absence of a federal statutory journalists’ privilege because sources rightly 
perceive that there is only a very small risk that the government or a private litigant 
will seek and a court will compel disclosure of their identity, or because they have 
reasons for making disclosure that outweigh perceived risks.”). 
 61. I take issue with Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel’s characterization of my 
proposal as an “empty promise of confidentiality.”  Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, 
at 1327.  Such a promise actually provides a very high degree of confidentiality, given 
the relatively miniscule number of confidential sources who are ever revealed due to 
litigation.  The history of investigative journalism has shown that, far from being 
empty, such promises of confidentiality are in fact more than adequate to encourage 
sources to speak.  Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel also falsely frame the issue when 
they say that a source in such a situation would “know that a journalist’s assurance of 
anonymity will never be honored.”  Id. at 1325.  As history has shown, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases the journalist’s assurance of confidentiality will still 
be honored, even in the absence of a shield law.   
 62. In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 44–46 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 63. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 27. 
 64. Taricani also reports that so far his sources have had no problem with this 
agreement.  See id.  It appears, therefore, that the arrangement troubles Taricani 
much more than it troubles his sources. 
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if that effort is unsuccessful.  Again, this agreement guarantees a 
great deal of confidentiality because the chances of the reporter 
actually being compelled to testify are very small. 
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that I am being 
unrealistic when I say that sources will agree to talk to reporters even 
in the absence of a shield law.  They use the example of a 
hypothetical government employee who learns of the Bush 
Administration’s unlawful warrantless surveillance program, and calls 
New York Times reporters Eric Lichtblau and James Risen to tell them 
about it.65  In the absence of a federal shield law, they argue, the 
reporters would not be able to assure the source of adequate 
confidentiality and the source would refuse to talk to them.  The 
problem with this argument is that, in reality, such a source 
apparently did contact those reporters, there was no federal shield 
law, the source talked anyway, and the story was reported—and to my 
knowledge, despite the grumblings of the Bush Administration, the 
reporters have not been subpoenaed to reveal their sources for those 
stories.  It’s hard to see how this story supports the argument that a 
shield law is necessary.  What’s more, the proposed federal shield law 
favored by Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel contains an exception 
for leaks of information that have harmed or will harm national 
security, which the government would certainly argue was true of 
these leaks.66   If sources are truly as skittish as Dr. Tucker and 
Professor Wermiel claim, they could not feel comfortable that their 
identities would be protected even if the federal shield law were 
enacted. 
According to an article by Lori Robertson in the American 
Journalism Review, the Dallas Morning News requires reporters to tell 
anonymous sources that in rare instances the reporter may be forced 
to identify them if efforts to protect them are exhausted in a legal 
dispute.67  Similarly, New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller has 
said that some reporters now agree with sources they will protect 
them to the extent legally possible, but if they lose a court fight they 
are not going to go to jail to protect the source.68  There is no 
indication that reporters at those papers have suffered from a lack of 
confidential sources.  Robertson also describes the experience of 
Fred Schulte, an investigative reporter for the Baltimore Sun for 
twenty-five years.  Schulte reports that he tells his sources he will 
 65. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1326–27. 
 66. See id. at 1335–37. 
 67. See Robertson, supra note 26. 
 68. See id. 
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protect them up to the point of a grand jury investigation, but if he is 
called before a grand jury he will have to testify.  All of his sources 
have agreed to these terms.69 Again, the purported evidence that the 
chilling effect exists is largely anecdotal and unreliable, consisting of 
a few reports of self-interested journalists.  Most evidence is in the 
form of affidavits of journalists submitted in various lawsuits, 
affirming the importance of confidential sources and citing examples 
where such sources were essential to their work.70  But considering 
that all of the sources in these past stories agreed to come forward 
without a federal shield law, such examples do not provide much 
support for the argument that a shield law is needed.  Such affidavits 
may demonstrate that confidential sources are important to 
journalism, but they also demonstrate, albeit unintentionally, that 
reporters can develop confidential sources without a federal shield 
law. 
As evidence of the supposed chilling effect, privilege supporters 
also like to cite a claim by the editor of Cleveland’s Plain Dealer that 
the paper has withheld publication of two stories of “profound 
importance” due to the fear of a leak investigation because the stories 
rely on confidential sources.71  The trouble with this “evidence,” of 
course, is that its veracity can’t be tested because the editor will refuse 
to reveal the information necessary to evaluate his claim.  Relevant 
questions would include:  What efforts has the paper made to go back 
to the sources to probe how concerned they are about 
confidentiality?  What efforts have been made to develop additional 
sources who may be willing to go on the record?  And is the editor 
really saying that if a federal shield law with its various exceptions and 
qualifications were enacted, that would make all the difference?72  
 69. See id. 
 70. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1168–69 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing affidavits of Judith Miller 
and Matt Cooper); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (BALCO), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (listing affidavits submitted by journalists). 
 71. See NORMAN PEARLSTINE, OFF THE RECORD:  THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND 
THE WAR OVER ANONYMOUS SOURCES 131 (2007); see also H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 
4, at 33 (testimony of Lee Levine, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP) (citing the 
same Plain Dealer anecdote); Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1323. 
 72. When the Plain Dealer anecdote is told, the editor of the paper is not reported 
as claiming that if there were a federal shield law he would go ahead and publish the 
stories—although that clearly is supposed to be the implication.  Given the many 
other ways that a source may be exposed, the exceptions in any proposed federal 
shield law, and the uncertainty about whether any investigation would even take 
place in a federal forum, it seems unlikely that the absence of a federal shield law was 
critical to the alleged withholding of these stories.  It is also interesting to note that 
the claim with regard to the Plain Dealer was not that sources were “chilled” from 
coming forward due to the lack of a shield law.  The sources did come forward, but 
the paper reportedly self-censored and refused to run the story out of fear of some 
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Untested assertions such as those by the Plain Dealer editor may be the 
stuff of lore within the journalism community, but such 
unsubstantiated, isolated anecdotes provide a poor factual 
foundation for proposed federal legislation. 
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel essentially concede that this 
supposed chilling effect cannot be established.  They conclude that it 
is “unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the lack of a shield 
law causes a chilling effect” because “that is a policy decision left to 
the legislative branch” and if Congress passes the shield law, the 
courts will enforce it.73  This may be true, but it leaves unanswered the 
question of just what Congress is supposed to rely upon when making 
this policy decision, other than the desires of the large media 
corporations lobbying for the law.  The argument essentially boils 
down to this:  “We can’t really demonstrate that this law is necessary, 
but the press wants it, and if we can convince Congress to pass it then 
we’ll be home free.”  This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the 
legal merits of the shield law.  
History demonstrates that reporters are able to guarantee sufficient 
confidentiality without a federal shield law.  As argued below 
concerning Myth #4, of all of the risks of exposure that a source faces, 
the danger that the reporter will be subpoenaed and compelled to 
testify is probably the most remote.  Privilege advocates are therefore 
necessarily arguing that there are a substantial number of sources 
who would willingly assume all of the greater and more immediate 
risks of exposure by leaking information, but will be deterred from 
coming forward solely by the most remote risk of all—the risk of the 
reporter being forced to testify.  Common sense and the historical 
record suggest this is not the case.  Some sources may well be afraid 
of exposure, and may seek assurances of confidentiality.  But these 
assurances may be given without a privilege and, considering the 
basket of risks a source faces, the presence or absence of a legal 
privilege is unlikely to weigh heavily in a source’s decision about 
whether to speak to a reporter. 
MYTH #4: IF THERE WERE A SHIELD LAW, REPORTERS COULD 
GUARANTEE SOURCES THEY WOULD REMAIN ANONYMOUS 
A corollary of the argument that sources are chilled by the lack of a 
privilege is the suggestion that, if we only had a federal shield law, 
imagined future litigation—arguably an abdication of the paper’s responsibility to 
inform the public. 
 73. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1324. 
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reporters could guarantee sources they would remain anonymous 
and thus sources would never be deterred from coming forward.  
This is another myth.  Leaking can never be made risk-free, and 
reporters—at least if they were being honest—could never guarantee 
sources that they would not be identified, even if there were an 
ironclad, absolute privilege law. 
A confidential source who decides to leak information to a 
reporter faces a number of risks that she will be exposed.  The 
source’s company or agency may conduct an internal investigation to 
discover the source of the leaks.74  Private lawsuits or government 
investigations may lead to the discovery of the source’s identity 
without testimony from the reporter.  Others who know of the leaks 
may come forward to expose the leaker.75  The reporter may decide 
that the public interest requires that the source be disclosed,76 or may 
identify the source inadvertently.77  Information in the story may allow 
others to guess the identity of the source. 
All of these risks exist whether or not there is a shield law, and 
whether or not the reporter is ever compelled to testify.  A reporter 
simply cannot assure a source that he or she will never be identified.  
There are too many ways for a source to be revealed that are out of 
the reporter’s hands.  This would be true even if there were an 
absolute, ironclad privilege with no exceptions.  In reality, of course, 
 74. In one recent case, a career intelligence officer was fired by the Central 
Intelligence Agency for leaking classified information to reporters that ended up in 
press reports about secret overseas CIA prisons.  Her identity was discovered not by 
subpoenaing reporters, but through an internal CIA investigation that included 
polygraphing employees.  See Dafna Linzer, CIA Officer Is Fired for Media Leaks, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 22, 2006, at A1. 
 75. In the BALCO case, for example, another individual who knew about the 
source’s contacts with the San Francisco Chronicle reporters decided to go to the 
authorities and disclose those contacts.  Thus the source’s identity was revealed 
without testimony from the reporters themselves.  See Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits 
Leaking BALCO Testimony, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2007, at A1. 
 76. In a recent case in Virginia, a reporter revealed that a prosecutor had 
improperly leaked to him damaging information about a state senate candidate, in 
an apparent attempt to damage the candidate’s election prospects.  The reporter 
who revealed his source said he had decided that it was the “moral thing to do.”  See 
Jerry Markon, Prosecutor Accused in Tate Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2007, at B3; see also 
Kathryn M. Kase, When a Promise Is Not a Promise:  The Legal Consequences for Journalists 
Who Break Promises of Confidentiality to Sources, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 565, 
575–77 (1990) (discussing cases where journalists chose to expose their sources); cf. 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (upholding a civil lawsuit brought 
by a source against newspaper publishers who broke a promise to keep the source’s 
identity confidential). 
 77. For example, reporter Jim Taricani, who was held in contempt for refusing to 
testify and identify a source, later inadvertently identified his source when a 
comment he made to an FBI agent allowed the agent to deduce the source’s identity.  
Associated Press, Prosecutors Eye Contempt Charges Against Reporter’s Lawyer, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2004, at B4. 
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any shield law passed by Congress will not be absolute; the proposed 
Free Flow of Information Act is full of exceptions, qualifications, and 
balancing tests.78  Even if that law were in place, therefore, reporters 
still could not guarantee their sources that a judge would not 
someday find that one of the many exceptions applied and the 
privilege had to give way. 
  There is no doubt that some sources are worried about being 
exposed.  The fallacy is believing that the presence of a federal shield 
law could ease those worries in any substantial way.  A source has far 
more serious and immediate risks to think about than the remote 
chance that the reporter might be compelled to testify a year or two 
down the road.  It is a myth to suggest that a federal shield law would 
allow reporters to put a source’s mind at ease and would thereby 
increase the flow of information to the public. 
MYTH #5: THE PRIVILEGE PRIMARILY PROTECTS INNOCENT 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Supporters of the reporter’s privilege argue that the privilege is 
necessary in order to protect innocent whistleblowers and ensure 
they will reveal important information they may have about 
government or private misconduct.  The reality, however, is that 
innocent whistleblowers are seldom the ones who end up being 
protected by a shield law.79  The privilege is much more likely to end 
up protecting a source who is breaking the law by talking to the 
reporter.  The shield law thus ends up encouraging and sheltering 
conduct that society has already determined should be unlawful. 
Consider a classic whistleblower example:  a Pentagon employee 
calls a reporter to reveal information the employee has about 
criminal conduct being engaged in by a defense contractor, with the 
assistance of certain officials within the Pentagon.  After talking to 
the source and investigating further, the reporter writes the story, 
indicating that a confidential source inside the Pentagon provided 
much of the information.  After reading the story, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office decides to open an investigation. 
 78. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1316–18 (arguing that an absolute 
privilege would be “unworkable” and describing the exceptions to the privilege in 
the proposed federal law). 
 79. The other flaw in this argument, of course, is the assumption that going to 
the press is the only option for a whistleblower.  Whistleblowers may report 
information to law enforcement officers, agency inspectors general, or congressional 
committees, and there are many statutory protections for whistleblowers.  See, e.g., 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H, 
50 U.S.C. § 403q (2006) (providing protection to employees of the various 
intelligence agencies who report wrongdoing to the relevant Inspector General). 
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To hear privilege advocates tell it, one of the prosecutor’s first steps 
would be to subpoena the reporter and try to compel her to reveal 
her source.  In truth, however, the DOJ regulations would not allow 
the prosecutor to do that, and in any event it would be unnecessary.  
Armed with the information in the story, the prosecutor, through the 
use of the grand jury, has tremendous power to investigate the case.  
She may subpoena documents, and subpoena and examine witnesses 
under oath.  There is no need to subpoena the reporter or to identify 
the source because the source was simply conveying information 
about the conduct of others, which may be investigated directly.  The 
same would be true of a private litigant who filed a lawsuit based on 
the allegations in the story.  Through the discovery process, lawyers 
may obtain documents, depose witnesses, and use other methods to 
investigate.80  As already discussed, for both legal and practical 
reasons, prosecutors and litigants are extremely unlikely to subpoena 
a reporter when there are reasonable alternative ways to obtain the 
information.  In a true whistleblower situation, those alternatives will 
almost always exist. 
Now contrast the case of an innocent whistleblower with that of a 
source who is himself breaking the law by the very act of providing 
information to the reporter.  Such a source is not simply passing 
along information about the misconduct of others, which may be 
independently investigated.  The misconduct is the conversation with 
the reporter itself.  There are likely only two witnesses to that 
misconduct:  the parties to the conversation, namely, the source and 
the reporter.  Even if the identity of the source is suspected, the 
source may lie, or may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege not to 
testify.  That leaves the reporter as potentially the only witness to a 
crime or other misconduct.  There often will be no reasonable 
alternative way to obtain the information, which, as discussed above, 
makes it more likely that a party will be forced to undertake the 
burden of subpoenaing the reporter.  If the reporter cannot be 
compelled to testify, then the crime will go unpunished or civil 
wrongs, such as Privacy Act violations, will go unredressed, and 
wrongdoers effectively will be immunized by the privilege.81
 80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 27–31, 33. 
 81. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel take me to task for this argument, noting 
that no one is legally immunized by the shield law and that I should be “more precise 
in [my] use of terms.”  Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1333.  It is, of course, self-
evident that formal legal immunity is not granted by the shield law.  That is why—to 
be precise—I have consistently said only that a shield law effectively immunizes some 
wrongdoers, by making it impossible to obtain evidence from the only likely witness 
to the misconduct—the reporter.  See  H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 52–63 
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For evidence regarding who is protected by a shield law, we again 
need only look to the recent high-profile cases involving reporters.  
In every one of these cases, a reporter’s privilege would have 
protected an alleged lawbreaker, not an innocent whistleblower.  In 
the CIA leak/Valerie Plame case, reporters would have been allowed 
to protect White House officials who improperly leaked classified 
information concerning the identity of a CIA agent and lied to cover 
it up.82  In the BALCO case, the reporters would have been allowed to 
continue to protect a defense attorney who committed perjury, 
obstructed justice, and attempted a fraud on the court.83  In the Jim 
Taricani case, the privilege would have shielded a source who violated 
(testimony of Randall Eliason, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington 
University Law School).  If a law operates to make it virtually impossible to investigate 
or charge someone, then they have been effectively immunized.  I am not alone in 
reaching this conclusion.  See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D.D.C. 
2007) (noting that granting the privilege in Privacy Act cases “would effectively leave 
Privacy Act violations immune from judicial condemnation, while leaving potential 
leakers virtually undeterred from engaging in such misbehavior when the 
communications are made to reporters”); Gabriel Schoenfeld, A License to Leak, 
WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 22, 2007, at 20 (arguing that a shield law would effectively 
immunize from prosecution those who unlawfully leak classified information to the 
press). 
 82. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, Valerie Plame, the Spy Who Got Shoved Out into the Cold, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at C1. 
 83. See Randall D. Eliason, Striking Out, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at 68.  Dr. 
Tucker and Professor Wermiel take issue with my criticism of the reporters in the 
BALCO case.  See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1329–31.  I have discussed 
BALCO at length elsewhere and won’t repeat all of my arguments here.  See Eliason, 
supra, at 68; H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 52–63.  The BALCO reporters 
allowed their source to use them and their reporting as part of a scheme to obstruct 
justice, and continued to protect and work with the source even after his scheme 
became clear and after the public already had all of the relevant information 
published by the reporters.  Contrary to Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel’s 
suggestion, Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1330, I have never argued that the 
privilege is inappropriate because reporters may profit from their stories or advance 
their careers.  I have, however, argued that the particular actions of the BALCO 
reporters demonstrate that application of a reporter’s privilege definitely does not 
always serve the public interest.  
     One additional point about BALCO:  Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel repeat 
the argument made by many privilege supporters that the reporters were sentenced 
to up to eighteen months in prison, which was a longer sentence than any of the 
BALCO defendants received.  Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1306.  This is 
incorrect.   The reporters were not convicted of a crime, and thus were not 
sentenced to anything.  They were found in contempt for refusing to testify in the 
grand jury.  The typical sanction in such a case is to incarcerate the witness until 
either he agrees to testify or the term of the grand jury expires.  A grand jury typically 
sits for a term of eighteen months, so any witness jailed for contempt could 
theoretically be incarcerated for up to eighteen months if he continued to refuse to 
testify (depending on when during the grand jury’s term the incarceration began).  
This is not a “sentence,” because the witness would not have to serve a day in jail if he 
simply complied with the judge’s order.  Like all witnesses held in contempt, the 
BALCO reporters would have held the keys to their own jail cell; any time spent in 
jail would have been a result of their own choice.   The BALCO defendants were not 
so fortunate.      
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a court order and acted in contempt by improperly leaking evidence 
that was potentially damaging to the defendant in an upcoming 
criminal trial.84  In the Wen Ho Lee and Hatfill cases, the privilege 
would have protected government officials who allegedly violated the 
Privacy Act by leaking personal information about suspects in a 
criminal investigation, causing them to be tried and convicted in the 
press and damaging their reputations.85
Privilege supporters usually invoke the icon of the source as a 
virtuous, innocent whistleblower motivated by a noble desire to 
inform the public through the media.  The reality, of course, is that 
many sources are anything but noble, and anything but innocent.  
Leaks to the press may be motivated by a desire for personal gain, 
revenge, or to attack or smear an opponent.  This is particularly true 
in the nation’s capital:  “Anonymous sourcing in Washington exists 
today much more to protect government spinners than it does actual 
whistleblowers.”86  The CIA leak/Valerie Plame case is just the most 
famous recent example.  Many sources are seeking to manipulate the 
media and plant a story to further their own ends or attack an 
opponent, and their journalistic enablers, eager for information, help 
them along by freely promising them confidentiality.87  A reporter’s 
privilege would encourage and shield such conduct.88
Journalists argue, of course, that even if some misconduct is 
shielded by the privilege, this is a necessary cost of protecting the 
public’s “right to know.”89  But simply invoking this talisman does not 
resolve the issue; the fact that information exists does not necessarily 
mean that the public has a “right to know” it.  My private medical and 
financial information appears in a number of databases, but the 
public does not have a right to see it.  Similarly, many of these 
reporter’s privilege cases actually involve information that the public 
does not have a right to know.  For example, the public has no right to 
know the sort of confidential grand jury information that was leaked 
to the press and published in the BALCO case.  That is the whole 
 84. See In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 40–43 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 85. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hatfill, 
505 F. Supp. 2d at 33.  
 86. Toobin, supra note 56, at 35 (quoting Martin Kaplan, associate dean of the 
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California). 
 87. See Howard Kurtz, Lashing Out from Under Cover:  Hey, Play Fair!, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 17, 2007, at C1 (criticizing the practice of political reporters allowing campaign 
aides to attack other candidates while remaining anonymous). 
 88. Cf. John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist Critique of the Journalist’s Privilege, 23 J.L. 
& POL. 115, 118 (2007) (arguing that the privilege would be bad policy because it 
would leave executive branch officials free to leak, smear, or even lie without fear of 
accountability). 
 89. See, e.g., Editorial, Time for a Shield Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2008, at A16. 
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point of grand jury secrecy, which exists for a number of good 
reasons, including to protect the privacy of witnesses and the rights of 
those being investigated.  The public did not have a right to know 
that Valerie Plame was a covert CIA operative because that 
information was classified to protect both her and the operations in 
which she was involved.  And, by definition, the public does not have 
a right to know the type of private information that was leaked in the 
Wen Ho Lee and Steven Hatfill cases, which is protected from public 
disclosure by a federal statute, the Privacy Act. 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that some sources may 
be chilled by the lack of a privilege, therefore, we must consider what 
kinds of sources are most likely to be affected.  True innocent 
whistleblowers are almost never revealed through subpoenas to the 
press and thus have the least reason to be concerned.  Those who are 
breaking the law by talking to the press are another matter.  They do 
run a slightly greater risk of exposure, and face more grave 
consequences if they are discovered.  Such sources might be 
marginally more likely to be deterred by fear of exposure—which 
means they would end up abiding by the law.  In the Judith Miller 
case, Judge Tatel, the judge most sympathetic to the reporters’ 
claims, observed that if those contemplating illegal leaks of classified 
information are deterred by the fear of a reporter testifying, then that 
is precisely what the public interest requires.90  Put another way, if the 
Judith Miller case means that a senior White House official stops and 
thinks twice when planning to attack a political opponent by leaking 
classified information—that’s a good thing.   
A shield law is most likely to be employed in cases where the source 
is breaking the law, and thus ends up encouraging and protecting 
conduct that society has already determined to be illegal and 
undesirable.  As a matter of policy, this makes no sense.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Branzburg, sources engaged in criminal 
conduct might prefer that there be a reporter’s privilege so they may 
avoid detection, but that desire, “while understandable, is hardly 
worthy of constitutional protection.”91  Nor is it worthy of statutory 
protection. 
 90. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 91. 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).  
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MYTH #6: THE LAW CAN ADEQUATELY DEFINE WHO IS A JOURNALIST 
ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE 
Any proposed shield law faces the challenge of defining who is a 
journalist entitled to invoke the law’s protections.  Given the rapidly 
changing nature of journalism, this is a daunting task.  Attorneys, 
doctors, psychotherapists, clergy, and other professionals whose 
communications are sometimes protected by a privilege all have 
particular educational and licensing requirements that define the 
members of the group, but anyone can call himself or herself a 
journalist.  There are no particular educational requirements and no 
licensing exams.92  Indeed, some would argue that journalism is not 
so much a profession as a process—the act of gathering information 
to transmit it to the public.93
Technology has broken down the practical barriers that once 
existed between the professional media and the public.  Thirty years 
ago, in order to reach a mass audience one needed a job with a major 
newspaper or network, or perhaps a book contract.  Today, one 
needs only an Internet connection, which is free at the local library.  
Internet journalists or “bloggers” have exploded onto the journalism 
scene.  Many people now obtain their news from the Internet, and 
many major stories are first reported on websites.94  Internet 
journalists are increasingly a part of the established media.  For 
example, during the recent trial of Scooter Libby, a portion of the 
courtroom seats reserved for the media were allocated to bloggers.95  
Recent cases have also recognized that there is no legitimate basis for 
distinguishing bloggers from more traditional journalists.96
Another important development is the rise of so-called citizen 
journalists.  With the Internet, individual blogs, and sites such as 
MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube, literally anyone can post 
information of public concern and make the information available to 
 92. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 140 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(“Reporters cannot be readily identified.  They do not have special courses of study 
or special degrees.  They are not licensed.  They are not subject to any form of 
organized oversight or discipline.”); see also Miller, 438 F.3d at 1156–58 (Sentelle, J., 
concurring) (discussing practical and constitutional difficulties involved in defining 
who is a journalist). 
 93. See SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW 6 (Free Press 2007). 
 94. See, e.g., Press Release, MSNBC.com, Internet Growing as News Medium, at 
Times Exceeding Traditional Media Usage, http://www.msnbc.com/m/info/ 
press/02/0107.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
 95. See Alan Sipress, Too Casual to Sit on Press Row?, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at 
D1; see also PUBLISH AND PERISH, supra note 39, at 16 (citing other examples of 
bloggers being treated as journalists). 
 96. See Lee, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 139–40; O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
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millions.  Cable news networks such as CNN and MSNBC actively 
solicit viewers to send in stories or video reports to be aired on the 
networks or posted on the news organizations’ websites.97  A private 
citizen who films an event with his cell phone and posts it on his 
MySpace page is engaged in the essence of journalism.  Given the 
current state of technology, it is no exaggeration to claim, as does the 
title of a recent book, that “we’re all journalists now.”98
Even more than thirty years ago in Branzburg, the Supreme Court 
noted that trying to define who was a “newsman” entitled to invoke 
the privilege “would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a 
high order” and would be a “questionable procedure.”99  A definition 
that focuses on the function of journalism will, given today’s 
technology, be extremely broad and will allow any individual, under 
the right circumstances, to claim to be a journalist entitled to invoke 
the privilege.  Any such self-proclaimed journalist could unilaterally 
decide to place certain information off-limits simply by agreeing to 
promise confidentiality to a source.  This would potentially exclude a 
huge amount of information from the legal system, and would result 
in substantial litigation costs as parties battled over the applicability of 
the virtually boundless privilege.  But a narrower definition of 
“journalist” will result in legislative line drawing between different 
First Amendment speakers, and will raise troubling constitutional 
questions.  Freedom of the press is an individual right, and a 
fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is to protect all 
speakers—not only the institutional, so-called “mainstream media” 
but also the lowly street-corner pamphleteer (or, perhaps more 
appropriate today, the lowly pajama-clad blogger).100
The Senate version of the proposed federal legislation contains a 
sweeping, functional definition of a journalist:  the privilege may be 
invoked by anyone engaged in journalism, which is defined as the 
“regular gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, 
writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information that 
 97. CNN refers to these citizen stories as “I-reports”, see http://www.cnn.com/ 
ireport/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); MSNBC calls them “First Person” reports, see 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16712587/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); and on Fox 
News, the citizen journalist submissions are called “U-Reports,” see 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/ureport/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); see also 
Howard Kurtz, Got a Camera?  You, Too, Can Be a Network Reporter, WASH. POST, Sept. 
24, 2007, at C1 (discussing the use of citizen journalists by the cable news networks 
and concluding that “it sends a signal that anyone, not just well-dressed professionals 
with good hair and a resonant voice, can be a journalist”). 
 98. GANT, supra note 93. 
 99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972). 
 100. See id. at 703–05; In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1156–57 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (quoting Branzburg).  
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concerns local, national, or international events or other matters of 
public interest for dissemination to the public.”101  This definition 
would appear to include most bloggers and other non-traditional 
journalists, at least those who are “regularly” engaged in such 
activities and are not one-time reporters.  As such, it has the potential 
for very broad application and for the shielding of a great deal of 
information from the legal system. 
The House version of the bill initially contained a similarly 
sweeping definition.102  Following hearings on the bill, the House 
amended the definition of journalist to require that a person be 
engaged in journalism for “a substantial portion of the person’s 
livelihood or for substantial financial gain.”103  This is a valiant effort 
to reign in the scope of the privilege, but what principle motivates 
this definition?  In terms of encouraging the flow of information to 
the public, does it make sense to grant the privilege to a full-time 
reporter for a small local paper with a few hundred readers, but to 
deny it to a blogger who reaches millions but does so for little or no 
compensation?  The definition also invites additional litigation over 
what constitutes a “substantial” financial gain or portion of a person’s 
livelihood.  What dollar figure or percentage of income is required 
before Congress considers one a real journalist? 
Any definition that attempts to separate the “real” journalists from 
the others immediately faces constitutional difficulty.  Such a 
definition will create two classes of First Amendment speakers:  those 
whose work Congress considers important or serious enough to merit 
legal protection, and those whose work it does not.  Any such 
definition is likely to favor the traditional, established media at the 
expense of lesser-known, and perhaps more daring or controversial, 
upstarts.  This congressional blessing of certain types of journalists is 
difficult to square with First Amendment principles.  Walter Pincus, 
investigative reporter for the Washington Post, has argued that 
allowing Congress to define who qualifies as a journalist means 
“journalists are in effect allowing Congress to regulate them.”104  This 
 101. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 2035, 110th Cong. § 8(5) (2007). 
 102. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (as 
introduced in the House, May 2, 2007) (covering “a person engaged in journalism”). 
 103. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (as 
passed by the House, Oct. 16, 2007). 
 104. Pincus, supra note 13; see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The very task of including some entities 
within the ‘institutional press’ while excluding others, whether undertaken by 
legislature, court, or administrative agency, is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing 
system of Tudor and Stuart England—a system the First Amendment was intended to 
ban from this country.”); Miller, 438 F.3d at 1158 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (arguing 
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also carries with it the risk that the political tides of the moment may 
result in a definition that places certain types of speakers or 
viewpoints at a disadvantage by denying them the privilege. 
The proposed federal legislation lists a number of categories of 
people and entities that will not qualify as “covered persons” deemed 
to be journalists under the law.  This includes those who are a 
“foreign power or agent of a foreign power” (I guess Al-Jazeera is out 
of luck?  How about the BBC?) as well as those who appear on certain 
government lists of suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations.105  
As Pincus aptly notes: 
If this bill had been proposed in the 1950s, I guarantee “covered 
persons” would not have included anyone associated with the 
Communist Party or liberal organizations designated as fellow 
travelers.  In the 1960s and 1970s it probably would not have 
included those associated with anti-Vietnam war groups or radical 
civil rights organizations. . . . Think who could be added to that list 
of uncovered persons by a future Congress when you talk about 
depending on Congress to approve the shield law.”106   
I find it very surprising that privilege supporters are apparently so 
sanguine about handing over to the government the power to 
determine who qualifies as a legitimate journalist and effectively to 
“blacklist” certain speakers and exclude them from the privilege.107
Large media companies, which are lobbying hard for the federal 
shield law, have little interest in ensuring that the privilege applies to 
bloggers or other non-traditional journalists, many of whom are their 
competitors.  They may well succeed in persuading Congress to adopt 
a definition of journalism that grants the privilege primarily to the 
traditional mainstream media or “professional” journalists.  But such 
a definition is constitutionally suspect and runs counter to all current 
technological trends—it is a twentieth-century definition for a twenty-
first century world.  It ignores the revolution that has fundamentally 
altered the way the world receives and distributes information.  
that extending the privilege only to a defined group of reporters risks the danger of 
creating a licensed or established press). 
 105. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (as 
passed by the House, Oct. 16, 2007). 
 106. Pincus, supra note 13. 
 107. See Jack Shafer, We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Shield Law, Part 2, SLATE, Apr. 16, 
2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2189279/ (“Although the language [in the proposed 
federal shield law defining a journalist] doesn’t sound onerous, journalists from 
Third World and former Soviet bloc countries know all about the dangers of letting 
governments define who is a journalist.  I’m not paranoid enough to believe that the 
clause in this bill will automatically lead to the mandatory licensing of journalists by 
the federal government, but it is an excellent foundation upon which to build such a 
card-issuing ministry of journalism.”). 
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Indeed, the efforts of the mainstream media to enact a shield law may 
be seen as an attempt to cling to power by obtaining legal recognition 
for their rapidly disappearing “special” status.108  It’s as though horse-
and-buggy operators were seeking legal protections in the early 
twentieth century, unaware that the world was passing them by.109
MYTH #7: A SHIELD LAW WILL KEEP REPORTERS FROM GOING TO JAIL 
A major rallying cry in support of the privilege is the claim that it is 
a disgrace to see reporters in the United States behind bars.  The 
jailing of Judith Miller in the CIA leak case was a significant factor 
behind the current push for a federal shield law.  Privilege 
proponents cite the jailing of journalists in nations such as Burma 
and China and criticize the United States government for behaving 
the same way.110  Testifying before the Senate in support of the shield 
law, Judith Miller piously concluded with a request that Congress 
“help ensure that no other reporter will have to choose between 
doing her small bit to protect the First Amendment and her 
liberty.”111  But the claim that passage of a federal shield law will keep 
reporters from going to jail is another myth.  It reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding both of the operation of a shield law 
and of the reason that journalists go to jail in these disputes. 
Imagine a lawsuit filed by a former prisoner at Guantanamo Bay, 
alleging that American agents tortured him.  A senior administration 
official is called to testify concerning government policies on torture.  
He refuses to testify, citing executive privilege.  The court rules that 
there is no applicable privilege, and orders the official to testify.  The 
official responds that, in order to preserve the constitutional 
authority of the executive branch and to safeguard national security, 
he will continue to refuse to testify, and is willing to go to jail if 
necessary.  How would most reporters react?  Would they praise the 
official as a hero bravely standing up for his principles through civil 
disobedience?  Or would they insist that the official follow the rule of 
 108. See id. (“Of the many flaws in the shield law, the most glaring is that it 
imagines that the highest wattage of the First Amendment belongs only to the guild 
that makes up the media industry.”).  
 109. Cf. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 529 (2002) 
(arguing that changing technology may necessarily “put an end to special legal 
treatment of the press”). 
 110. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S4800–01 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (remarks of Sen. 
Lugar in support of the Free Flow of Information Act); PUBLISH AND PERISH, supra 
note 39, at 1.  
 111. Reporter’s Privilege Legislation:  An Additional Investigation of Issues and 
Implications:  Hearing on S. 1419 before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(testimony of Judith Miller). 
  
2008] THE PROBLEMS WITH THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 1371 
                                                          
law and obey the court’s order, and that he be jailed if necessary in 
order to persuade him to testify? 
Or imagine a civil suit filed against a newspaper for libel.  A witness 
called by the newspaper has evidence critical to the paper’s defense 
but refuses to testify, claiming that the information was given to her 
by her husband and is protected by the spousal communications 
privilege.  After a hearing, the judge rules that the claim of privilege 
has no basis, and orders her to testify.  She continues to refuse, 
claiming that important privacy principles compel her to defy the 
court’s order and she is concerned that, if she testifies, spouses in the 
future may be afraid to confide in each other.  Would the newspaper 
praise her principled stand and agree that she should not have to 
testify?  Or would it seek to enforce the court’s order by having the 
witness held in contempt and fined or jailed until she complies, or 
seek some other sanction such as dismissal of the case? 
The rule of law in this country means that courts, not self-
interested individuals, decide questions of constitutional law and 
privilege.  It requires that the final orders of the courts be respected 
and adhered to by all citizens.  This principle is fundamental to our 
justice system.  Even President Richard Nixon, hardly a poster child 
for law and order,112 recognized the primacy of the rule of law.  When 
the Supreme Court ruled against him on his claim of executive 
privilege and ordered that the Watergate tapes be turned over, Nixon 
complied and resigned the presidency rather than defy the courts.113  
Journalists rightly expect that both government officials and private 
citizens will obey lawful court orders, and justly criticize them when 
they do not.  The media rely on the courts and on respect for the rule 
of law to protect them from unjustified libel suits, to prevent prior 
restraints on publication, and otherwise to safeguard their legal 
rights. 
When it comes to the reporter’s privilege, however, many 
journalists’ respect for the rule of law seems to take a back seat.  If a 
reporter asserts a privilege and a court rules that the reporter must 
testify, many reporters will defy the court’s order, choose to be held 
in contempt, and even go to jail, as did Judith Miller.  And the rest of 
 112. This was aptly pointed out by Professor Wermiel during the Symposium.  See 
Stephen Wermiel, Professor, Washington College of Law, Remarks at the American 
University Law Review Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, 
Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast” 
hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the press:  The growing use of 
subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 113. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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the media, rather than criticizing the reporter, will hail her as a hero, 
give her journalism awards, raise money for her legal bills, and claim 
that the press is under assault because they are being asked to abide 
by the law like everyone else. 
The CIA leak/Valerie Plame case provided a useful illustration of 
this point.  Two journalists and their employers—Judith Miller and 
the New York Times, and Matt Cooper and Time Inc.—fought all the 
way to the Supreme Court to argue that they should not have to 
reveal their White House sources to the Special Prosecutor.114  Every 
federal judge to hear their arguments ruled against them.115  After the 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case,116 Time Inc. chose to 
comply with the court’s order and to turn over Cooper’s notes and 
materials.117  The company issued a statement noting that “[t]he same 
Constitution that protects the freedom of the press requires 
obedience to final decisions of the courts and respect for their 
rulings and judgments . . . .  [O]ur nation lives by the rule of law 
and . . . none of us is above it.”118  For this responsible course of 
action, Time was roundly condemned by Cooper and by others in the 
journalism community.119  The editorial page of the New York Times 
pronounced itself “deeply disappointed” with Time Inc.’s decision to 
abide by the law.120  For her part, Miller chose to defy the court’s 
order, and went to jail for nearly three months before relenting and 
 114. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005). 
 115. Id.; In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004); In 
re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 116. Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005); Cooper v. United States, 545 
U.S. 1150 (2005). 
 117. See PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 113.  Norman Pearlstine was at the time 
editor-in-chief of Time, Inc., and made the decision to turn over Cooper’s materials. 
 118. Id.   
 119. See id. at 110–36.  To their credit, Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel appear 
to endorse the actions of Time magazine in turning over Cooper’s notes, and note 
that reporters who violate lawful court orders should have to face the consequences.  
See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1332.  This is a commendable position.  
Unfortunately, though, Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel are decidedly in the 
minority among privilege advocates on this question.  The overwhelming majority of 
the journalism community condemned Time’s decision to obey the law, applauded 
Judith Miller’s defiance of the court, and argued that the press was being unfairly 
persecuted.  See Pearlstine, supra note 71, at 110–36.  Therefore I cannot agree with 
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel that “[n]ews organizations . . . need to be given 
more credit for their willingness to comply with lawful orders after they have 
exhausted all appeals.”  Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1332.  As Time, Inc.’s 
experience shows, such willingness is extremely hard to come by in the journalism 
community. 
 120. See Editorial, Judith Miller Goes to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A22. 
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agreeing to testify.121  The New York Times and most other newspapers 
hailed Miller as a hero.122
This double standard is indefensible.  Reporters have every right to 
claim a reporter’s privilege and to appeal any adverse court decisions 
as far as they can.  They do not have the right to decide that, once 
their legal appeals are exhausted, they will place themselves above the 
law and refuse to honor court rulings.  Michael Kinsley, former 
editorial page editor of the Los Angeles Times, has pointed out that 
journalists are quick to criticize others who defy the law, and yet many 
“believe passionately that it is not merely okay but profoundly noble 
to follow their own interpretation [of the First Amendment] and 
ignore the Supreme Court’s.”123  As the former editor-in-chief of Time 
put it, “[h]ow . . . could we, as journalists, criticize others who 
ignored the courts if we did so ourselves?”124  The irony was best 
summed up by Gregg Easterbrook, who wrote that the reaction of the 
journalism community to Time Inc.’s decision to turn over Cooper’s 
notes could be headlined:  “BIG CORPORATION OBEYS LAW, 
JOURNALISTS OUTRAGED.”125
Journalists argue that they have an ethical obligation not to identify 
their sources, and that court orders compelling them to testify place 
them in an impossible dilemma.126  If that is true, it is a dilemma 
entirely of journalism’s own making. Reporters claim it is unjust to 
ask them to break promises to sources that they will never identify 
them under any circumstances.  What they fail to recognize is that 
they have no legal right to make such a promise in the first place.127  
It’s fine if journalists believe that their professional ethics require 
them to maintain the confidences of sources.  But in other 
professions, such as law and medicine, requirements of 
confidentiality include the express or implied qualification that 
 121. See PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 121–48. 
 122. See Editorial, supra note 120. 
 123. Michael Kinsley, Constitutional Cafeteria, WASH. POST, May 5, 2006, at A19. 
 124. PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 98. 
 125. Id. at 139–40.  For more examples of the few journalists who supported Time 
Inc.’s decision, see id. at 137–40. 
 126. For example, Lance Williams, one of the BALCO reporters subpoenaed to 
identify his sources, said that by asking him to do so the government was 
“demand[ing] that I throw over my most deeply held ethical and moral beliefs, both 
as a journalist and as a man.”  Posting of Teri Thompson & T.J. Quinn to N.Y. Daily 
News Sports Investigative Team Blog, Chronicle Reporters:  We’ll Go to Prison if Necessary, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/iteam/2006/09/chronicle-reporters-well-go-
to.html (Sept. 21, 2006, 22:45 EST). 
 127. See PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 122 (noting the argument of the Special 
Prosecutor in the Plame case that “neither [Judith] Miller nor anyone in government 
can promise confidentiality when the law doesn’t allow it”). 
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confidences may be protected only to the extent legally possible.128  In 
other words, there is a recognition that while engaging in one’s 
profession and adhering to one’s ethical obligations, one must still 
abide by the law—which includes obeying lawful, final court orders 
finding there is no privilege in a given case.  Journalism appears to be 
the only profession that believes adherence to its own ethics may 
include a duty to violate the law.  Journalists cannot create an ethics 
code that includes a requirement to violate the law and then act 
surprised when the law objects. 
Journalists in this country are not jailed for what they write, and are 
not being censored when they are jailed for refusing to testify.129  This 
is why arguments comparing journalists jailed in the United States to 
journalists jailed in countries such as China, Burma, or Cuba are off 
the mark.130  In totalitarian countries, reporters are jailed for the 
content of their work.  In this country, if a reporter is jailed it is not 
for what he or she has written but for refusing to abide by a lawful 
court order, entered after due process of law and a full and fair 
hearing.  Rather than demonstrating that the United States is akin to 
a totalitarian country, cases like Judith Miller’s demonstrate just the 
opposite:  that we are a society governed by the rule of law, and that 
no one has a right to decide for herself what laws she will obey.131
 128. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) (requiring 
confidentiality, but allowing lawyers to reveal information “to comply with other law 
or a court order”). 
 129. As Professor Clymer and I both noted during the Symposium, the title of our 
panel, “Censoring and Prosecuting the Press—An Assessment of Reporters’ Shield 
Legislation,” was a misnomer.  Censorship—the control of media content—is not an 
issue in these cases.  Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director of the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, agreed that these cases are not about censorship.  See 
Steven D. Clymer, Symposium Transcripts, Panel:  The Role of Whistleblowers to Facilitate 
Government Accountability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1220, 1220 (2008) (. . . [T]he issues about 
the reporters’ privilege have nothing to do with either press censorship or with 
prosecuting the members of the press.”); Randall D. Eliason, Professorial Lecturer in 
Law at American University, Washington College of Law and George Washington University 
Law School, Remarks at the American University Law Review Symposium:  Left Out in 
the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America 
(Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/ 
symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast” hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the 
press:  The growing use of subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2008); see also Dalglish, supra note 25. 
 130. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S4800–01 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (remarks of 
Senator Lugar in support of the Free Flow of Information Act); PUBLISH AND PERISH, 
supra note 39, at 1. 
 131. For the same reason, comparing reporters who are held in contempt for 
refusing to testify to individuals prosecuted 200 years ago under the Sedition Act of 
1798 is comparing apples and oranges.  See, e.g., PUBLISH AND PERISH, supra note 39, at 
3–5 (comparing recent subpoenas of reporters to prosecutions under the Sedition 
Act).  Those prosecuted under the Sedition Act were prosecuted for the content of 
what they wrote.  See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE:  A 
  
2008] THE PROBLEMS WITH THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 1375 
                                                          
A shield law will not keep journalists out of jail.  Any shield law will 
have exceptions, which means there will be cases in which a court 
finds that the privilege does not apply and orders a reporter to 
testify.132  If history is a guide, in many such cases the journalist will 
refuse to testify, will be held in contempt, and will be sent to jail.  
Given this history, one has to question why Congress should grant a 
legal privilege to a group that will happily accept the benefits of that 
privilege when they win but will defy the law when they lose.133  
Journalists go to jail not because of the lack of a privilege, but 
because of their unique and arrogant notion that journalists, not the 
Congress and not the courts, should decide what the law requires.  As 
long as that notion persists, journalists will continue to be found in 
contempt and will continue to be locked up, even if the shield law is 
passed.  With or without a shield law, journalists can stop going to jail 
tomorrow.  All they have to do is obey the law.134
MYTH #8: THE SHIELD LAW WILL PROTECT CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
INCREASE THE FLOW OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC135
Consider the following cases:  
  • White House officials, in an attempt to punish a political 
opponent, improperly disclose classified information concerning 
his wife’s CIA employment, thus destroying her career and possibly 
damaging a number of covert CIA operations.  Prosecutors and the 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11–21 (2007).  This is not true for reporters who 
are held in contempt for refusing to testify. 
 132.  See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1316–18 (discussing the exceptions in 
the proposed federal shield law). 
 133.  Patrick Fitzgerald, the special prosecutor in the CIA leak/Valerie Plame case, 
has suggested that any privilege Congress enacts should require that any person 
seeking the protection of the privilege first submit the subpoenaed information 
under seal to the court, to be turned over if the claim of privilege fails.  Patrick J. 
Fitzgerald, Shield Law Perils . . ., WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A25. 
 134. Journalists often claim that when they defy court orders to testify, they are 
engaged in civil disobedience.  See Editorial, supra note 120, at A22 (praising Judith 
Miller’s “civil disobedience” and comparing her to Rosa Parks and Martin Luther 
King Jr.).  But journalists who work for powerful media companies are hardly 
disenfranchised victims of an unjust legal system.  They simply don’t like the result 
the legal system has reached when it comes to the privilege.  It is not true civil 
disobedience to litigate within the court system with some of the best lawyers in the 
country, expect your opponents to abide by the rulings of that system, and then defy 
the rulings if you lose.  That’s just gaming the court system and placing yourself 
above the law.  As Michael Kinsley has argued, if what Judith Miller and the New York 
Times did can be justified as civil disobedience, then “almost any law anyone does not 
care for is up for grabs.”  Michael Kinsley, Op-Ed, Reporters Aren’t Above the Law, L.A. 
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at M5. 
 135. Particular credit for the structure of the argument in this section goes to 
Professor Clymer, who used a similar formulation during his remarks at the 
Symposium. 
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individuals harmed by these disclosures seek to discover who was 
responsible. 
 • To protect the rights of defendants in a criminal case to a fair 
trial, the judge places certain confidential case information under a 
protective order.  In violation of that order, someone in the case 
discloses secret grand jury information, resulting in a storm of 
negative publicity about the defendants and making it difficult for 
them to get a fair trial.  The judge who issued the protective order 
wants to find out who is responsible. 
 • Government agents conducting a criminal investigation 
improperly disclose information about a suspect that is protected 
by the Privacy Act.  As a result, the suspect is essentially tried and 
convicted in the press of committing a heinous crime and his 
reputation is destroyed, although he is never actually charged.  He 
wants to find out which government agents were responsible. 
In these disputes, most would expect those dedicated to preserving 
civil liberties to weigh in on the side of the criminal defendants or 
private individuals who were damaged by the improper acts of 
government agents.  But of course, just the opposite is true.  The first 
example is the CIA leak/Valerie Plame case, the second is BALCO, 
and the third is the case involving Dr. Steven Hatfill (or Dr. Wen Ho 
Lee).  In each case, civil liberties groups weighed in against the 
interests of the individuals seeking to vindicate their rights and 
discover which government agents had wronged them, and in favor 
of allowing government officials and large corporations to keep that 
information secret.   
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and First Amendment scholar 
Anthony Lewis recently noted the injustice that could result from the 
application of a shield law in a case like Dr. Wen Ho Lee’s: 
Suppose that a federal shield law had existed when Wen Ho Lee 
sued to seek some compensation for his nightmare ordeal.  The 
journalists who wrote the damaging stories would have had their 
subpoenas dismissed, and without the names of the leakers Lee 
would probably have had to give up his lawsuit.  Is that what a 
decent society should want?  Would that have really benefited the 
press?  Or would it have added to the evident public feeling that 
the press is arrogant, demanding special treatment?136
Many appear willing to sacrifice the civil liberties of those who are 
injured by government officials or others in these cases, due to a 
reflexive opposition to any subpoena to the press at any time, no 
matter what the circumstances.  As a result, in these privilege cases, 
 136. LEWIS, supra note 131, at 93. 
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civil liberties groups side with large corporations such as the New 
York Times Co. and Hearst, rather than supporting the individuals 
who were harmed.  But as Lewis points out, the press “is not always 
the good guy.”137  What about a little consideration for the civil rights 
of those who were injured?  Why should Valerie Plame not be able to 
learn who in the White House destroyed her career?  Why should 
people such as Dr. Lee or Dr. Hatfill be prevented from finding out 
who injured them?  Do we really want to encourage and protect such 
improper and harmful actions of government agents? 
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that prosecutors and 
litigants in cases such as Valerie Plame or Wen Ho Lee seek the 
identity of sources not from an altruistic desire to inform the public, 
but because they want to prosecute the wrongdoers or seek legal 
damages from them.138  That may be largely true, but it seems to me 
beside the point.  Regardless of motivation, the issue, according to 
privilege advocates, should be whether the flow of information to the 
public is enhanced.  The position advocated by Professor Clymer and 
me results in wrongdoers being punished, those who are injured 
being able to recover for their injuries, and the public receiving 
important information concerning unlawful acts by government 
officials.  The position advocated by shield law proponents results in 
wrongdoers being protected and encouraged to commit illegal acts, 
no remedy for those who are injured, and the public being denied 
access to information about government misconduct.    
The primary rationale for the shield law is that it will increase the 
“free flow of information” to the public.  In fact, just the opposite is 
more likely to be true.  As discussed above, the shield law is unlikely 
to play any significant role in determining whether or not a source 
comes forward.  Without a shield law, investigative journalism using 
confidential sources will continue to thrive as it has for decades.  The 
effect of the law, therefore, will more likely be to prevent the public 
from learning additional information, particularly about individuals 
engaged in wrongdoing through improper leaks to the press.  The 
privilege thus acts to slow or stop the flow of information to the 
public, not increase it. 
In the Plame case, the effect of a shield law would have been to 
prevent the public from learning which White House officials had 
improperly leaked classified information to the press and lied to 
cover it up, and Scooter Libby would never have been brought to 
 137. Id. 
 138. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1325. 
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trial.  In BALCO, the privilege would have prevented the public from 
learning that a defense attorney had improperly disclosed secret 
grand jury testimony, had lied to a judge about it, and had tried to 
get his client’s case dismissed by blaming the government for the 
leaks.  In the Wen Ho Lee and Hatfill cases, the privilege would have 
prevented the public—and the injured plaintiffs—from discovering 
which government officials had wrongfully disclosed information 
about them that was subject to the Privacy Act.  In each case, rather 
than providing the public with more information, the privilege would 
act to allow journalists to deny important information to the public. 
This is perhaps the ultimate irony of the proposed shield law.  As 
Michael Kinsley wrote about the Plame case, for all the grand talk 
about the First Amendment, “This isn’t about the press’s right to 
publish information.  It is about a right to keep information secret.”139  
The law purports to ensure that the public will receive the greatest 
amount of information possible concerning matters of public 
importance.  What it does instead is create a favored and privileged 
class of unelected, unaccountable, journalistic arbiters of the public 
interest, with the power to decide for themselves what the public 
should and should not know. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidentiary privileges do have costs.  Every privilege keeps 
potentially relevant information from finders of fact in a legal 
proceeding, and has the potential to result in injustice.  A law such as 
the proposed federal reporter’s privilege, with its many exceptions 
and qualifications, will also result in substantial litigation costs as 
parties battle over its applicability.  Before enacting such a law, 
Congress should take care to ensure that it rests upon a solid factual 
and legal foundation, and that the benefits of the privilege would 
outweigh the costs.  Privilege advocates have not met their burden of 
demonstrating that the federal reporter’s shield law is needed or will 
be effective. 
The shield law continues to move through Congress, resting in 
large part on the myths discussed above.  Newspapers around the 
country—which of course have a conflict of interest140—editorialize in 
 139. Michael Kinsley, Op-Ed, Right Principle, Wrong Context, WASH. POST, July 10, 
2005, at B7. 
 140. See Ryan Grim, WH Pushes Senators on Shield Law, POLITICO, Apr. 29, 2008,  
available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0408/9937.html (noting that 
some congressional staffers “refer to the shield bill as the Reporters’ Conflict of 
Interest Act, since the same group that is reporting on its progress through Congress 
could benefit from its passage”). 
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favor of the bill, creating their own impression of a groundswell of 
support.  Members of Congress see a chance for an easy vote that will 
please their local editorial boards and will allow them to paint 
themselves as champions of the First Amendment.  There is not 
much of a constituency speaking out against the shield law.  But it is a 
bad and unnecessary law, based on false assumptions and sloppy 
arguments, and will do more harm than good.  Wrapping it in the 
banner of the First Amendment and the free press won’t change that.
 
